Got off lightly? Germany after the federal elections

Last Sunday, German voters cast their ballot to elect a new government after the break-up of the “traffic light” coalition in November 2024. After a hasty two-month campaign with migration and economy as the two main talking points, and with many arguing that stakes had never been this high for any federal election thus far – domestically and internationally – the result stands as a manifestation of the right-wing, conservative shift many Western societies are currently experiencing. While the coalition building process seems to be a rather easy one this time, the tasks awaiting the new government aren’t – and expectations as well as responsibilities are massive.

Tilman Voss

Rewind: the collapse of the government and the Winter campaign

This winter, Germany experienced another turbulent few months, set off by the break-up of the historically unpopular “traffic light” coalition consisting of Social Democrats (SPD), Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), and Liberals (FDP) – dreaded by ones, dearly awaited by others – in early November. Back then, chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) fired his Minister of Finance Christian Lindner (FDP) over disputes regarding the ability to take on new debt in order to finance projects in the military and other sectors through a reform of the German “Schuldenbremse” (debt brake). An extra portion of spice to this already dramatic break-up (with both sides accusing each other of being responsible for the emerging chaos) was added when shortly after it was uncovered that the FDP had actually planned out its exit from the coalition in an internal paper titled “D-Day”. The name of the paper (a reference to the allied invasion in Normandy during the Second World War against Nazi Germany) and other war-type notions used in the paper infuriated many and constituted an already fiery start to what would be one of the shortest voting campaigns Germany had so far experienced.

At the start, many expected the ongoing economic stagnation, the war in Ukraine, or necessary military and social reforms to be the main topics in debates. But things turned out differently. Following several attacks on civilians, for which people with a non-German background were identified as perpetrators, the discourse shifted drastically towards migration – and towards ways to limit it, be it or not compliant with EU law. One of these attacks, which occurred in Aschaffenburg and was carried out by a 28-year-old Afghan male who had already lost his right of residence, led not only to massive sorrow across the country, but in parliament triggered the breaking of the cordon sanitaire against the far-right extremist AfD – i.e. the practice to not rely on the party for any decision made in the parliament – on the state-level: a possibility that had loomed over the parliament for a while (EW readers knew it first). Shortly after the attack, CDU opposition leader Friedrich Merz brought in a parliamentary motion on further limiting migration, which only reached a majority thanks to the AfD’s votes.

This event triggered huge protests across Germany. Many viewed the decision as an unprovoked normalisation of the AfD, as the motion didn’t have any binding consequences for the government’s work, but still sent a daring signal and set a possible precedent for future CDU-AfD cooperation. Even retired chancellor Angela Merkel (herself CDU) voiced public criticism, stating that the decision to vote together with the AfD had been “wrong”. For the CDU and Merz himself, the move was still necessary, be it done with the far-right party’s support or without it, as “something [in migration policy] had to change”, as Merz himself put it, while trying to reassure the public that he would never systematically cooperate or form a coalition with the party. Fairly enough, it is no secret that the breaking of the cordon sanitaire in the Bundestag didn’t really constitute a new paradigm, since it had been done before on the regional level. The AfD itself celebrated the move, stating that “a new time had begun”, with the party finally defeating its political stigma. The chaos was perfect when two days later, a similarly phrased law initiated by the CDU fell through as some members of the CDU and the FDP defied the party position, rendering the slim parliamentary majority of both parties and the AfD impossible.

In general, the short campaign had several consequences: next to a new level of polarization in German politics, together with disinformation attempts, and fiercely fought TV debates (and so many of them, that the average TV consumer must have seen major politicians more often than their family in the last two weeks before the elections), those were also purely practical: many Germans living abroad didn’t see their voting documents arrive in time and were hence not able to participate in elections.

The result stands, however: 28,5 percent for the CDU/CSU; 20,8 percent for the AfD, 16,4 percent for the SPD, 11,6 percent for the Greens; 8,8 percent for Die Linke (The Left), 4,97 percent for the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW); and 4,3 percent for the FDP, with the highest electoral participation rate since Germany’s reunification: 82,5 percent. But what do these numbers mean for each party?

Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU)

The clear (and unsurprising) winner of these elections are the centre-right CDU/CSU, whose candidate Friedrich Merz is most likely to be the next chancellor. Still, with less than 30 percent, the party union might not be too happy with their result – especially as polls conducted in December and January still saw them well above 30, if not 35 percent. However, the mood at the election party was good when the first results were announced. After Merz's controversial vote with the AfD, many party officials feared to see voter turnout plummet shortly before the elections – just like in 2021. This didn’t happen, and it currently also seems that Merz’ main goal, a coalition consisting of two and not three parties, is within reach. Results confirm that a CDU-SPD coalition will yield a parliamentary majority – and the SPD has already signalled openness for this.

Alternative for Germany (AfD)

The far-right populist AfD, a hotbed for authoritarian, nationalist, islamophobic, and historical-revisionist opinions is another clear winner, with voting results doubling vis-à-vis 2021 – but first reactions at the party’s electoral celebration still displayed a certain disappointment about “only” reaching 20 percent. Many argued that the campaign couldn’t have gone better for the far-right party. With the topical shift to migration (limitation) – the party’s parade topic – and the massive support received by the new libertarian stronghold USA through Elon Musk or J.D. Vance, and various disinformation campaigns observed in the social media realm clearly favoring the AfD, the party probably saw itself scoring up to 25 percent of votes. According to some voices, the party’s candidate Alice Weidel might have been responsible for losing some voters due to her harsh rhetoric and her sometimes unsympathetic or aggressive appearances in debates or interactions with the public. Regardless of Weidel’s style of politics or irreal expectations, the AfD has established itself – and made clear that it wants more.

Social Democratic Party (SPD)

The Social Democrats are the big flop of this election. Led by chancellor Scholz, who first had to assert himself against voices demanding the more popular defence minister Boris Pistorius as candidate, the party’s campaign never really gained traction. It is not like Scholz didn’t try: in the run-up to the elections, he attempted to counter criticism accusing him of lacking empathy, by heavily attacking his opponents whenever he could, painting the picture of a more emotional and approachable leader than before. However, those attempts didn’t stick with the public, and his often criticized and apparent weakness when it comes to acknowledging own mistakes surely didn’t positively affect his (already low) popularity.

After the election, Scholz declared he wouldn’t see himself in charge of leading any coalition negotiations as the result was nothing but a disappointment he took responsibility for. Nevertheless, he will be part of the new parliament, as he won the district in which he directly ran as a candidate.

Die Grünen (The Greens)

The Greens, although being part of the unpopular “traffic light” coalition, definitely saw its chances for expanding its voter base. Why else would they have declared their main lead figure Robert Habeck, previously Minister of Economy and Climate Transformation, as “chancellor candidate” while polling at around 11 percent? Habeck, liked by ones due to his open and explanatory style of politics and disliked by others due to a law on the replacement of fossil-powered heaters he had aimed to pass during his tenure as Germany’s “green head” (which back then created a lot of financial insecurity), tried many things in order to leverage voter potential. He attempted to portray himself as a person aware of the struggles of the average voter through various video formats such as the “kitchen table discussions”, where he would visit ordinary people’s houses to sit down and have a talk with them. With that in mind, the result is nothing but a disappointment for the party – especially among young, progressive voters, the result was not enough to stop the general decline in voting shares. After the election, Habeck announced that he would for now refrain from representing the party in any sort of leading position.  

Die Linke (The Left)

The Left’s result is arguably the biggest surprise of these elections. Having been declared virtually dead for the past years, the party had only been polling at around 3 percent when the government collapsed. But it was Merz’ AfD stint that got the party back to life. The speech of main candidate Heidi Reichinnek in that very meeting in which she heavily attacked Merz for his decision went viral and led to a huge influx of new party members. Together with the “Mission Silver Lock”, that described the endeavour of three party veterans to win direct mandates in their respective districts to circumvent the five-percent threshold enshrined in German electoral law, the party successfully curated a social media momentum which made the very mission unnecessary in the end due to the unexpected wave of approval. Being especially successful among young voters (18-24 years) with 25 percent of approval, the party managed to mobilize a group that the Greens might have initially eyed at.

Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW)

The irony of Die Linke’s success is that the BSW led by Sahra Wagenknecht, the woman who previously served as the head of Die Linke before founding her new left-conservative party in 2021 has now failed to make it into parliament. This by the smallest margin possible: with 4,97 percent of votes, only around 13.000 were missing. It seems that the party’s momentum (9 percent in the European elections of 2024) has been short lived, and the party has for now failed to create its own niche in the political landscape. Before the elections, Wagenknecht had stated that she would retire from politics if she didn’t make it into the parliament. First reactions indicate that she might have changed her mind, and that the BSW has not yet given up on their place in parliament. Party officials (including Wagenknecht) stated that the inability of some voters abroad to cast their vote might make the election as such invalid. They went on to accuse opinion polls of having “tilted against the party” by making it seem like the party was not going to make it into parliament, which in turn negatively influenced voters' behaviour.

Free Democratic Party (FDP)

After February 23, it is safe to say that the “D-Day” plan of the FDP (and whatever it entailed) catastrophically failed. With 4,3 percent of votes, the five-percent threshold was only remotely close for the party. The party tried everything to turn the narrative about the government collapse in its favour, but the campaign might have been lost from the start. In the end, even the long standing partner CDU turned its back to the liberals, with Merz advising against voting for the party in early February and calling it a “useless vote”, since the party’s entry into the parliament was already then unlikely. As a consequence, party chief Lindner has announced his exit from politics, together with the general secretary of the party and former Minister of Justice Marco Buschmann. How it will continue for the FDP outside the government remains unclear: for now, a new leader has to be found.

Outlook: What to expect from a new government?

As already touched upon before, the most likely formation of a new government is a “Great Coalition” consisting of both CDU/CSU and SPD. This would support Merz in his declared endeavour to form a new government until Easter (April) at the latest. A sign of relief for many, as negotiations for any other form of coalition would most likely have led to difficult and protracted coalition negotiations. For Germany’s international allies – especially Europeans – the prospect of a quick formation is surely good news as well, since many view Germany’s European leadership essential in times when not only Ukraine, but the whole transatlantic partnership with the US seems to be endangered, and it is clear that Europe has to define itself differently than it did so far (especially defence-wise). On election night, Merz – former MEP between 1989 and 1994 –  signalled an increased German engagement in such matters, stating that Europe would need to be more independent from a US which was “clearly indifferent towards Europe’s fate”. These words have already sparked discussions on whether he might be the one paving the way towards an intensified defence cooperation between European (not NATO) countries.

However, it remains unclear if he will actually be able to pull it off, since the domestic situation hasn’t really changed. Germany will still most likely have to reform its current “debt brake” to increase (defence) spending. For this, a constitutional change requiring a 2/3-majority in the parliament needs to be decided on – a majority which the AfD and The Left who both spoke out against such reform are now able to block. Merz, who also capitalised on accusing the past government of an irresponsible financial policy due to their reform efforts on the instrument, seems however inclined on easing financial constraints a bit: according to media reports, he has reached out to both SPD and Greens to decide on an extra €200 billion assets package to enhance Germany’s defence capabilities before the new government and parliament is formed. Whether this move might constitute a first blow to his credibility and whether both parties will agree to his proposal remains unclear for now.

But not only international expectations are high. Germany’s economy is stagnating, social reforms are demanded, and the topic of migration will continue to require huge attention by incumbent decision-makers, also due to the AfD’s ability to politicise the topic further. Merz, who has never before been in any official political position, will have to prove himself against this backdrop. He is by far not the most popular politician inside the country, and past verbal gaffes and polarizing decisions (such as the January migration vote) have left many questioning whether he possesses the right characteristics to unite an increasingly polarised society of a country in which it seems to be ever more hard to agree on compromises.

The looming horror scenario of an AfD victory in the next elections scheduled for 2029 (if the government holds on for that long) will require the centrist parties to not make people lose even further trust in liberal democracy. The current campaign has surely not helped this endeavour and consequently raised the stakes for the parties involved, while the AfD has already locked eyes on its new major target – the CDU itself. Whether the new government is “democracies last bullet”, as Bavarian CSU leader Markus Söder put it slightly dramatically, or the opportunity to stabilise the future by enabling a “true change of course”, as the CDU puts it (or nothing of the two), remains to be seen - what is sure is that the German public and the world will be watching attentively.