The Broken Compass: How Fico Turned Slovakia into Another EU’s Political Outcast

Is it breaking free of the EU´s influence on its foreign policy, or is it drifting into dangerous isolation? Currently, Slovakia is redefining its foreign policy under PM Robert Fico in a shift from its pro-European stance. While the government claims to seek sovereignty and balance —being “open to all four sides of the world”—its growing ties with Russia and China and its waning commitment to EU unity are raising alarms among its European allies. This shift not only signals a dramatic change in Slovakia’s role on the global stage but also exposes deeper domestic and regional tensions that could reshape the future of the European Union. 

Laura Valachová and Michaela Weberová

In September 2024, the three highest state figures, PM Robert Fico, President Peter Pellegrini, and the Speaker of the Parliament Peter Žiga signed the memorandum of the direction of the Slovak foreign policy. Though the memorandum is non-binding and bears a rather symbolic value, the current state of Slovakia´s foreign policy can be best explained by this particular treaty. While the Memorandum states that Slovakia is anchored within the EU and NATO, most of its agenda tries to establish a sovereign policy “open to all four sides of the world” while denouncing different treatment of particular countries. Within the past year, the shift of the country’s political compass has mainly been echoed in the normalization of diplomatic relations with Russia. Apart from his ally Viktor Orbán, Fico represents one of the main opponents to military and financial support of Ukraine, and he heavily lobbies for the continuation of the gas transit to Europe, despite the expiration of the treaty with Ukraine that initially let through supplies despite the ongoing war. 

This approach was meant to herald a demonstration of Fico´s sovereignty, but in reality, it masks a deeper shift away from Western alliances. In October 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced the closing down of embassies in Denmark, Norway, and its consulate in Poland, while opening new embassies in Algeria, Tanzania, Philippines, and Malaysia, countries which have also warmed up their relations with Russia in recent years. In early December of 2024, a delegation consisting of government officials traveled to Saint Petersburg to negotiate with Gazprom, a majority state-owned Russian gas supplier, on the issue of ending gas transit. Perhaps the final snub towards fellow EU officials was Fico’s latest visit to Moscow where he went to negotiate the continuation of gas transit and discuss a possible end of the ongoing full-scale war in Ukraine. 

Going against the (Gas) Flow

European countries have slowly been ending their energy ties to Russia - or at least they have been trying to. The traditional route for gas supply through Ukraine has been closed since January 1, 2025, as per the treaty that guaranteed transit until the end of 2024. Despite nearly three years of war, Ukraine still ensured the transit of gas during the contract period, but Russia's gas company Gazprom completely halted its supply at 5:00 GMT after Ukraine refused to renew the transit agreement. This simple fact did not sit right with the Slovak PM Fico who in response made an unannounced visit to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Not much is known about this visit as government officials kept it a secret. Robert Fico claims they talked about the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, ways to end the conflict, and the end of gas being transported through Ukraine. This unannounced visit made waves both in Slovakia and in the EU. The leader of Slovakia's opposition party, Branislav Gröhling, called Prime Minister Fico's visit to Putin a betrayal of the country. Czech foreign minister condemned the visit saying “We don´t have to gravel before mass murderers”. The visit was also noticed in Kyiv. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy criticized Fico for meeting Putin, accusing him of aiding Russia by keeping Slovakia dependent on Russian gas. The visit raised concerns within the EU about Slovakia's commitment to energy security amid the Ukraine-Russia conflict. 

Ironically, by attempting to shift its energy and foreign policy away from the EU sphere and increase its sovereignty, Fico is only becoming increasingly more politically isolated and dependent. The criticism of its historically closest ally highlights this breakaway from a pro-European foreign policy. Czechia and Slovakia have shared higher-than-standard diplomatic relations for the past three decades, arguably due to a shared political past. Starting in 2012, the governments of both republics organized annual inter-governmental meetings to coordinate both domestic and foreign policies of both countries. However, in spring of 2024, Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala announced that the Czech government is no longer willing to hold such meetings due to the radical shift in Slovakia´s foreign policy and its view of the war in Ukraine. The “re-standardization” and cooling of the Czecho-Slovak relations indicate that rather than “playing fair” on all sides, Fico´s government wants to elude its responsibilities towards its peers in the EU and NATO. 

Fico at Home and Abroad

The question that an outsider to Slovak politics might ask now is why such a small EU country and comparatively insignificant EU contributor is defying the unity of the European foreign policy and risking both political and economic isolation within the EU. The answer to this question is unfortunately not straightforward and requires understanding three things: the state of internal affairs in Slovakia, the previous experience of the Slovak´s southern neighbor with being a political outcast within the EU, and most importantly, Fico’s trajectory as a political figure. 

The current shift in Slovak foreign policy might serve as a decoy used by the prime minister to mask problems of an internal character. The recent labor strike of medical doctors over salaries and working conditions in Slovakia has almost led to a massive exodus of Slovak doctors who were willing to resign at the beginning of the new year - the problem has not been resolved yet with negotiations only having been postponed until the end of February. A tape made in 2021, legally obtained by the Slovak police, caught Fico and his peers scheming and pointing toward potential corruption of government officials. However, Slovaks (and their representative politicians) also face many long-standing internal problems including the disintegration of the cultural sphere, a massive brain drain, and an ongoing cost of living crisis. The gradual shift of Slovak foreign policy to the East might be the next attempt to please conservative voters and pensioners who are the traditional electorate of Fico´s party Smer-DS. Daily struggles that Slovakia faces are overshadowed by frequent news about deepening ties to autocratic regimes. While the government highlights these external maneuvers, critical issues continue to fester in the background. This dual strategy of neglecting internal reform while courting Eastern allies could deepen the polarization of Slovak society, creating a rift between those nostalgic for traditional alliances of the past Eastern bloc and those striving for Western integration. As the February deadline for resolving the medical strike looms, the question remains whether Fico’s administration will address pressing domestic matters or continue its reliance on foreign policy as a smokescreen for internal inaction.

Additionally, Fico’s trajectory as a politician is not only indicative of personal opportunism but also mirrors and reinforces Slovakia’s increasingly eastern-leaning foreign policy. From his initial encouragement of the country’s active role within the core of EU policy, he has shifted dramatically to embrace a more eurosceptic stance, aligning himself with the most fringe anti-EU and pro-Russian currents of the Slovak public discourse. This transformation reflects his ability to adapt to the changing sentiments of his voter base, prioritizing populist narratives over consistent ideological positions. As a result, Fico has become a key driver in amplifying Slovakia's drift away from its Western orientation, shaping a political landscape where divisive rhetoric and nostalgic sentiments about Soviet-era ties thrive at the expense of Slovakia's commitments to European unity. 

With Slovakia`s foreign policy paradigm shifting, its southern neighbor Hungary´s Viktor Orbán is no longer the only outcast leader within European structures anymore. To understand Fico´s changing attitudes within international affairs, it is necessary to examine Orbán as his current closest ally. Hungary´s deterioration of the rule of law, its unlawful treatment of asylum seekers, and the change in the electoral system largely favoring Orbán´s Fidesz party have been a central concern for more than a decade over its dismissal of the EU´s treaties and rights to be guaranteed in all Member States. Ever since the beginning of Russia´s full-scale war in Ukraine, Hungary has vetoed and blocked all major decisions of the EU in the matter until amendments or concessions were made to Hungary, mainly relating to unfreezing its funds. It is questionable whether this strategy might one day start backfiring against Orbán. Recently, Hungary has permanently lost access to 1 billion euros from its frozen EU funds since the New Year, amid the country´s recession, shrinking economy, and a 4.5% budget deficit. However, Orbán is no longer alone and has found an ally in its northern neighbor willing to take on the same path in shaping its foreign policy. 

Part of Orbán’s strategy to overcome the effects of EU funds freezing is to pursue investment from abroad and through bilateral agreements with non-EU countries, particularly with China. Fico´s latest steps showcase that his cabinet is attempting to copy Orbán’s approach to navigate both internal and international crises on a national level. Apart from re-starting negotiations over gas supply with Russia, Fico, accompanied by several ministers from his cabinet, spent a week in China where he negotiated for stronger economic cooperation between the two countries. Fico and Orbán now seem to coordinate their activities within the EU structures, consequently allowing greater maneuverability and leverage for both. 

Both Fico and Orbán have vested interests in defying the European unity over the armament of Ukraine and Russian gas. However, the lack of an adequate and firm response from the EU towards both countries´ opportunistic political endeavors is only further enabling the likes of Fico and Orbán to rebel and find their ways around the minuscule sanctions for their defiance. Fico might not be a significant European player, but mere verbal condemnation of his actions is insufficient to save the already fragile European unity. Soon, due to the far-right Freedom Party of Austria´s (FPO) win in parliamentary elections in Austria and Germany´s upcoming snap elections with the Alternative for Germany (AfD) being second in the polls, Fico (and Orbán) might be joined by other Member States´ leaders in their quest to reshape foreign affairs of the EU towards Russia and China. Thus, the tale of the four sides of the world that Fico´s government agenda established, becomes mainly a story of how European Unity continues to deteriorate due to the personal interests of a few Member States´ leaders.